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The few existing competitive models of entry for multimarket industries (i.e., Berry
(1992), Gelfand and Spiller (1987), Reiss and Spiller (1989)) make (at least one of) two
fundamental hypotheses. First, they consider settings of perfect and complete informa-
tion. Second, they consider entry decisions on a partial equilibrium basis. Namely, even
if they happen to account for externalities across markets, they model the entry decisions
of rms on a market conditional to the rms entry decisions across the other markets in
the industry (unless they happen to consider a simple two-market setting). Both these
hypotheses are empirically questionable. Firms rarely know, or observe accurately, some
of their rivals costs or demand parameters. Besides, in multimarket settings, entry
or production decisions on a single market typically a¤ect the state of the other mar-
kets within the industry. Namely, these settings require models of simultaneous, global
decision-making across markets. It is at these two levels (i.e., incomplete information
and global decision-making) that lies the contribution of our article to the empirical
literature on entry.
We propose a model of simultaneous entry decisions for N symmetric rms across M
heterogenous markets. There are externalities across markets in that a rms revenues on
a market are a function of entry decisions across the M-1 other markets. In this model,
each rm is endowed with a vector of private marginal cost signals. Namely, a rm
does not observe its competitors costs at the time it selects its entry strategies across
the M markets. Cost signals are drawn independently and identically across rms and
markets from a joint probability density function which is common knowledged among
rms. Hence, a rm decides simultaneously whether or not to enter and, if it enters,
how much to produce on each market based upon its costs vector and the distribution
of its rival costs.
This model denes a complex optimization problem since a rms optimal strategy
depends need not only upon the characteristics of the M markets, but also upon the
uncertainty regarding its rivals costs. Firms have to commit to quantity choices on a
2market without knowing ex-ante how many rms will compete on that market. The
model is, in fact, analytically untractable and we propose an algorithm based upon
Monte Carlo simulations to determine numerically the Nash Equilibrium solution.
We rst solve the rst-order conditions to determine systems of equations dening a
treshold cost value above which a rm does not to enter a market and, pending entry, the
optimal quantity to produce on that market. We then proceed to simulate repeatedly
the game in order to approximate the expected quantity produced by a rm on each
market. This numerical algorithm provides the estimated probability of entry on each
market. Finally, we apply the inference method recently proposed by Florens et al.
(1997) to endogenously estimate the parameter µ of the cost density function.
As an application, we consider the entry decisions of American Airlines and United
Airlines at their Chicago OHare hub airport. These two airlines not only share similar
cost structures at the network level, but they have similar brand images and market
structures at OHare. They also dominate the Chicago OHare market. Both airlines
are taken to simultaneously select their seat capacity (on nonstop ights) across a sample
of airport-pair markets from Chicago OHare. The sample data, from the third quarter
of 1993, consists in 85 markets with ight service from at least one of American Airlines
or United Airlines, and in 15 markets with no nonstop ight service.
The results yield expected seat capacity and revenue levels on a market. These closely
match observed mean values on the sample markets. We also estimate a mean value
for the cost per available seat mile (CASM) of $0.127 for American Airlines and United
Airlines at Chicago OHare. CASMs are the standard measure of costs in the airline
industry and trade publications provide mean values, at the network level, ranging from
$0.10 to $0.13 for both airlines.
We further determine treshold marginal cost values above which an airline does not
enter on a market. From these tresholds, we obtain the estimated probability that an
airline o¤ers ights on a market. A panel data comparison of entry decisions and seat
capacity levels for each sample market reveals that markets with the lowest estimated
probability of entry have, in fact, experienced greater relative uctuations in the number
3of entrants and in seat capacity levels over time.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model and
section 3 proposes a numerical algorithm to determine its Nash Equilibrium solution.
Section 4 discusses the application to the airline industry while section 5 outlines the
estimation of revenue schedules for airline markets. The details on the econometric
method to estimate games of incomplete information are in section 6. Section 7 describes
the sample data and the estimation results. We conclude in section 8.
2. The Theoretical Model
We consider a Cournot model with M markets (m =1 ;:::;M) and N symmetric rms
(i =1 ;:::;N). Firms are endowed with a vector of private signals ci =( ci1;:::;c iM);
where cim represents rm is constant marginal cost on market m. The signals cim are
drawn independently and identically across rms and markets from a probability density
function (hereafter p.d.f.) f (cim=µ); where µ denotes a vector of parameters: The p.d.f.
f (:) and the parameter µ are common knowledge to the rms. Rival rms private signals
c¡i are not observed at the time rm i selects its strategy. The economist observes only
the density function f (:):
The inverse demand specication for rm i on market m is linear, symmetric across
both rms, and it allows for externalities in demand across markets. Namely, rm is
price on market m, Pim, is a function of rm is quantity choices across all M markets:1






qjm ¡ ±mqim (2.1)
where qim is the quantity produced by rm i on market m and the values of the parameter
vector (®m;¯m;°;±) are common knowledge. Setting xed costs at zero, the prot of
1From a conceptual point of view, we could have allowed for externalities in the cost function as
well. The demand approach is more appropriate to an airline setting.
4rm i on market m is:
¼im =[ Pim ¡ cim]qimIfqim>0g (2.2)
where Ifqim>0g is the indicator function dened as
Ifx>0g =
(
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ts over the
network of M markets:
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subject to qim ¸ 0 8m =1 ;:::;M
where '(ci;µ) is the equilibrium strategy function. Since rms are ex-ante symmetric
we have 8j 6= i
Ec¡i [qjm=µ]=Ec¡i0 [qj0m=µ]=E [qm=µ] 8i 6= i
0 or 8j 6= j
0 (2.5)
The optimization problem can then be written as:
q⁄
i = '(ci;µ)=Arg max
fqimgm=1;:::M
PM




¡(N ¡ 1)°mE [qm=µ] ¡ ±mqimqimIfqim>0g (2.6)
subject to qim ¸ 0 8m =1 ;:::;M
Equilibrium strategies '(ci;µ) are, therefore, symmetric across rms.
53. Computing the Nash Equilibrium solution
The theoretical model presents three key characteristics. First, it is a game of incom-
plete information since rivals marginal costs are unknown at the time of decision. Second,
rms decide simultaneously whether to enter and how much to produce on each market.
Third, the quantity produced on market m creates an externality a¤ecting prots, and
consequently entry and quantity decisions, on all other markets m0 6= m: To determine
the Nash Equilibrium strategy a rm must consider jointly all markets and the uncer-
tainty on its rivals costs. Such strategy cannot be determined analytically. Instead we
propose an algorithm to calculate the Nash Equilibrium solution numerically.
First, we remark that the constraint qim ¸ 0 8m =1 ;:::;M can be redened equiva-
lently by
qim ¸ 0 , cim · cim 8m =1 ;:::;M (3.1)
where cim i sat r e s h o l dc o s td e  n e ds u c ht h a t r mi decides to enter market m only
when its marginal cost is su¢ciently low (cim · cim). Note that cim is determined only
at the equilibrium and it is a function of rm i m a r g i n a lc o s t so ne v e r ym a r k e t(ci).






















¡®m +( N ¡ 1)°mE [qm=µ]+cim
2¯m
8m =1 ;:::M (3.4)




Ifcim•cimg 8m =1 ;:::M (3.5)






Ifcim0•cim0g ¡ (N ¡ 1)°mE [qm=µ] ¡ cim 8m =1 ;:::M
(3.6)
If the expected quantity produced by a rm on each market E [qm=µ]( 8m =1 ;:::M)
were known and provided a vector of costs fcimgm=1;:::M we could solve the system of
equations (3.6) to obtain the vector fcimgm=1;:::M. Then, using the set of equations
(3.5), we could calculate the equilibrium strategies fq⁄
imgm=1;:::M. However, there is no
analytically tractable way to calculate E [qm=µ]. We propose to replace E [qm=µ] by a
Monte Carlo approximation b E [qm=µ]:
The idea of the algorithm is to consider a value for E [qm=µ]; say "m; then for a given
set of simulated costs we can solve the systems of equations (3.5) and (3.6) to obtain
some simulated quantities for player i. Finally, we take advantage of the symmetry of
the model to compare the empirical mean of the simulated quantities of player i and "m.
If "m is a reasonable approximation of the expected quantity E [qm=µ] then it should be
close to the average simulated quantity. The approximation b E [qm=µ] is then dened as


















8m =1 ;:::M (3.7)
where e cl
im (8m =1 ;:::M and 8l =1 ;:::;MC) is a Monte Carlo simulated cost drawn
















The determination of b E [qm=µ] may be time consuming but it is not computationally
challenging. Indeed, the algorithm requires to estimate b E [qm=µ] for any value of µ which
7requires to solve numerically the system of equations 3.6 for each of the N Monte Carlo
simulations. However, these equations are linear up to an indicator function and there
exist numerous numerical procedures to solve these systems in a matter of seconds.
Once b E [qm=µ] has been determined we can calculate fq⁄
im;cimgm=1;:::M for a given cost
vector fcimgm=1;:::M ; or symmetrically we can invert the strategy function '¡1 (q⁄
im;µ)
and calculate fcim;cimgm=1;:::M for a vector of observed optimal quantities fq⁄
imgm=1;:::M :
As we shall see in the next section, the econometric technique subsequently used in the
empirical application to the airline industry, requires the inversion of the equilibrium
strategy.
4. An Airline Application: American and United at Chicago
OHare
This section details the application of the theoretical model to an airline environment.
We describe, the airline setting of interest, and provide an empirical basis for the main-
tained hypotheses of the theoretical model.
4.1. Firms, Markets
American Airlines and United Airlines are two major US carriers, with similar cost
structure (see table 1), sharing a primary hub airport at Chicago OHare. They not
only have similar brand images in Chicago, but also serve a similar route structure
from that airport. For example, United has nonstop ights on all seventy-two Chicago-
m a r k e t sw i t h( n o n s t o p ) i g h t sf r o mt w oo rm o r ea i r l i n e s ,A m e r i c a no n6 9 .B a s e du p o n
the Databank DS T-100 data, they control 89.55% of passenger enplanements at OHare.
As a comparison, Delta Airlines, the third largest carrier at OHare, has only 3.3% of
passenger enplanements and o¤ers ights on just 8 of the 124 Chicago-markets. The
market structure at Chicago is also very stable over time. Over a period stretching from
the third quarter of 1992 to the fourth quarter of 1993, there is little new entry/exit
on Chicago-markets and almost all of them are the result of decisions from either of
8American and United.
Therefore, following Brander and Zhang (1990, 1992), we assume that American
Airlines and United Airlines are two symmetric rms in duopoly competition at Chicago
OHare.
4.2. Decision Variables
W em o d e le n t r yd e c i s i o n so fA m e r i c a nA i r l i n e sa n dU n i t e dA i r l i n e so nm a r k e t sf r o m
Chicago OHare airport. The decision variables are the seat capacity on (nonstop) ights;
qim; each of these airlines o¤ers on Chicago markets. The choice of seat capacity, over
price or passenger volume, is prompted by the nature of the industry. Flight schedules,
which detail departure times and aircraft type, change little over time once published
and, if anything, at a much slower rate than prices. The preference of seat capacity over
passenger volume relates to the cost structure at the market level. Modeling passenger
choice would demand, in this entry model, a representation of ight frequency choices
in order to properly characterize the xed costs of entry since these would include both
aircraft and airport-specic xed costs. This would require a model with two-decision
variables and greatly complicate the current structure of the model.
4.3. Marginal Costs
Our model calls for a representation of costs at the market level. The standard char-
acterization of market-specic costs in the airline literature is one of a xed cost per
ight plus a constant marginal cost per passenger (references). This implicitly denes,
graphically, a step function between the total aircraft costs and the seat capacity on a
market. A linear approximation to this step function seems reasonable since seat capac-
ity are modelled quarterly. This leads us to assume, at the market-level, a linear relation
between total aircraft costs and seat capacity.
Fixed costs then represent the airport-specic xed costs of o¤ering ights on a mar-
ket. At Chicago OHare, the number of markets with ights from American Airlines
and United Airlines varies little around the period of our sample data (table). In ad-
9dition, both airlines have dedicated airport facilities at OHare, allocated under 30-year
leases, which underwent major updates in the early 1990s. This leads us to treat all
airport-specic xed costs as being sunked prior to our sample period.
We need a representation of an airline is marginal cost per available seat on a market.
Following Brander and Zhang (1990) and Morrison and Winston (1995), we propose the
following specication for airline is marginal cost per available seat on a Chicago market
m:






where CASMi is the marginal cost per available seat-mile for airline i on Chicago mar-
kets, AV GLGHTCHI is the average mileage length of a Chicago-market, and MILESm
is the mileage of market m: CASMs are the standard measure of costs for airlines and
they are only reported on a network-wide or aircraft-type basis. For American Airlines
and United Airlines in the third quarter of 1993, we nd, across publications, CASM
gures ranging from 10 cents to 13 cents depending upon which particular categories of
costs are accounted for.
Our article di¤ers from existing airline studies, such as the aforementioned, in that we
endogenously estimate mean CASM values. Namely, we have that airline i on market m
draws a private marginal cost signal cim = CASMim from a p.d.f. f (:jµ) where values for
the parameter vector µ are estimated endogenously. The marginal cost signals are drawn
independently and identically across airlines and markets from the pd.f. f (:jµ): We feel
comfortable with the assumption of an identical distribution for American Airlines and
United Airlines at Chicago OHare airport. Chicago is a major hub in each airlines
network and, as Brander and Zhang (1990) note, it plays a similar role in each airlines
network. The airline trade literature also reports similar CASM gures for both airlines
(table). We will look to relax the independence hypothesis in later work.






5. Estimation of Revenue Schedules
5.1. Local and Connecting Passengers
Airline customers are identied by an origin and destination airport. For example,
B-D customers have airport B for origin and airport D for destination. A local B-D
passenger is a B-D customer who takes a (nonstop) ight on market B-D. A connecting
B-D passenger is a B-D customer who travels on an indirect route from airport B to
airport D. An indirect route is a path made up of ights which links two airports and
requires at least one stop at an intermediate airport.
An airline o¤ers ights across a network of markets. It can therefore include a ight
on a market B-D into the path of indirect routes between some airports Ai and Ej,
with Ai 6= B and/or Ej 6= D (see gure 1 for an illustration). For example, airport
Ai (Ei) may be any origin (destination) airport on a market to airport B (from airport
D) where the airline has ights. This means that an airline may sell seats on market
B-D to both local B-D and connecting Ai-Ej passengers. It is the presence of these
connecting Ai-Ej passengers which leads to demand synergies across entry decisions on
connected markets. Connecting Ai-Ej passengers account for, on average, 58% of an
airlines passenger volume on a B-D market in the third quarter of 1993.
5.2. An Aggregated Specication
We are looking for an aggregated representation of revenues per seat at the market-level;
i.e., a revenue schedule function for seat capacity. There are few, if any, references in
the literature. Both Reiss and Spiller (1989) and Richard (1999) estimate aggregated
market-level demand functions but the context of their analyses bears little comparisons
with the present article. Berry (1992), meanwhile, species revenues on an airline market
11only in terms of market characteristics and the number of competitors.
We could model demand on an origin and destination basis and model a passengers
choice of an itinerary between two airports B and D through a logit specication (not
unlike Lederer). There are two main problems with this approach. First, while logit
models make for a rich demand specication, such specications are not analytically
tractable within this papers framework. Second, the presence of connecting passengers
means that, in our analysis of entry across M markets, we would have to account for
demand across all pairwise combinations of M cities. To provide some measure of scale,
we note that, in the third quarter of 1993, an airline on market B-D draws, on average,
connecting Ai-Ej passengers from 57 indirect routes with one intermediate stop and 54
indirect routes with two stops.
We propose, rather, to talk of a revenue schedule for airline is seat capacity on a
market m. This schedule describes revenues per seat for airline i on market m as a
function of seat capacity choices across connected markets. It is dened as the sum of
two revenue schedule functions, one for each of local and connecting passengers, since
both local and connecting passengers contribute to revenues at the market-level2.
This approach requires, however, to assume an allocation rule for connecting ticket
prices. Indeed, a connecting Ai-Ej passenger for a market B-D pays one ticket price for
the indirect Ai-Ej route. To determine revenues from connecting passengers Ai-Ej on
a market B-D requires allocating the price paid by these passengers among the various
ights on their indirect routes. While a choice of allocation rule has some arbitrariness,
mileage is not only the variable most highly correlated with airline prices, but also the
primary cost variable. Hence, we allocate the ticket price of a connecting passenger to
the various ights on a mileage basis.
Finally, unlike traditional models where demand and price are jointly determined,
rms, in our framework, select their seat capacity, then subsequently observe the actual
realization of revenues. Hence, estimation of the revenue schedules is by ordinary least-
2Cargo shipments can be a source of revenues for airlines on some markets. We unfortunately have
no data on cargo shipments or value.
12squares.
5.3. Sample Data for the Estimation of the Revenue Schedules
The data are compiled from three databases for the third quarter of 19933.A l l t h r e e
databases report data on a per airline, per airport-pair market basis (i.e., unit of ob-
servation is airline i on a market from airport B to airport D). Databank 1A, from the
Department of Transportation (DOT), is a 10% random sample of all airline tickets sold
each quarter. It yields, for this analysis, the data on ticket prices and on the number of
local and connecting passengers. Databank DS T-100, another DOT database, provides
monthly data on seat capacity and passenger volumes. Only the major U.S. airlines and
their (directly-owned) subsidiaries (e.g., shuttle, commuter airlines) report to Databank
DS T-100. We turn to the OAG North American editions for a complete listing of all
scheduled ight operations for the third quarter of 1993. Given Databank 1A data are
quarterly data, revenues and seat capacities are, for this paper, dened on a quarterly
basis. Exogenous market characteristics are obtained from Census data.
For the estimation of the revenue schedules, we consider a sample of 919 airport-pair
markets for the third quarter of 1993. The sample consists in all markets for which
we have a complete set of third quarter of 1993 Databank 1A and Databank DS T-100
data (see appendix B for ampler details). Airport-pair markets in the sample are non-
directional in that we have averaged the data for each market across both directional
ows. Namely, the unit of observations is a market B-D rather than a market from B to
Do rf r o mDt oB .
5.4. A Revenue Schedule for Local Passengers
Sample markets have from one to four airlines with ights. An airlines share of passenger
enplanements at the origin airport on a directional market has been argued to signi-
cantly determine the distribution of local passengers across competitors on that market
3Ampler details on the data, and construction of the variables, are provided in appendix A.
13(Borenstein (1990)). In our sample, 84% of markets with two or more airlines include at
least one hub airport for each competitor. By looking at markets on a non-directional
basis, we are, therefore, evening out most of the discrepancies in airport presence on
a market. This leads us to treat products (seats) on a market as homogenous across
airlines with regards to local passengers4.
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im is airline is revenues from local passengers (across coach and rst class)
on market m and qim is airline is seat capacity (on nonstop ights) on market m:
The explanatory variables are the mileage of market m (MILESm), the population
(POPUL m), income level (INCm), and square miles area (AREAm) for both cities
including the airports on the market.
Estimation results are provided in table 16.
4While we have data on an airline￿s airport presence, we have no data on airline-speci￿c exogenous
variables which could measure the demand from local passengers for a particular airline.
5The speci￿cation does not account for connecting B-D passengers. We do not have data on the
number of seats allocated to connecting B-D passengers across the various ￿ights on these passengers￿
indirect paths. We only observe the number of connecting B-D passengers per market which makes it
di¢cult to incorporate these passengers in our speci￿cation. Richard (1999) also provides some evidence
that local and connecting passengers may su¢ciently di⁄er in their ￿ight frequency valuation, hence
valuation of time, that we could consider the number of connecting B-D passengers on a market to be
exogenous.
6With regards to these results, we note that the high implied (from estimated value of –
l) elasticity
of seat capacity with regard to revenues per seat from local passengers can be explained. One of the
primary sources of dispersion in seat capacity across markets are varying levels of connecting passengers.
Connecting passengers account, on average, for 58% of the passenger volume on a ￿ight. In fact,
connecting passenger volumes have higher correlation with seat capacity levels than local passenger
volumes.
14Table 1.
Estimated mean parameter values (standard deviations) for the revenue schedule function for local passengers
Dependent variable is REV l
m
Cst POPULm MILESm INCm ln(INCm)A R E A m ±
l slope
986.44 0.1463 0.0186 0.1268 -159.94 0.2556 -1.1£10¡4
(179.39) (0.030) (0.0011) (0.0168) (27.98) (0.0594) (1.1£10¡5)
5.5. Connecting demand
T h ef a c tt h a ta na i r l i n em a ys e l ls e a t so nm a r k e tB - Dt oc o n n e c t i n gA i-Ej passengers
creates demand synergies between entry decisions across markets. In essence, the greater
the number of markets with ights at each of airports B and D, the greater the scope of
Ai-Ej markets an airline may draw passengers from for travel on B-D.
In our framework, we determine, for each airline i on a market m, that airlines
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: This restriction to one of airports B or D is necessary to
limit the scope of our analysis to entry decisions at a particular airport. It remains
that on the 84% of sample markets where an airline has a single hub airport, the chosen
airport (B or D) is always the hub airport. On these markets, almost all of an airlines
connecting Ai-Ej passengers happen to transit through that hub airport.
An examination of the data also reveals that an airline draws rather similar numbers
of connecting passengers from each Ai-Ej market since each such market contributes, on
average, 1.68% (median is 0.89) of the airlines total connecting A-E passenger volume.
Hence, we assume that any increase in capacity across markets j, j6=m, generates a
constant increase in the number of connecting passengers on a market m. We do allow,
nevertheless, for that increase to vary with market ms mileage.
Finally, if a connecting passenger switches airlines on an indirect route, that passenger
15is said to interline. Morrison and Winston (1995) document that, by 1994, fewer than
1% of all connecting passengers interline. We thus specify that the scope of synergies
for an airline on market B-D is only a function of its own seat capacity choices and not
its competitors.
We have this linear specication for revenues per mile from connecting Ai-Ej pas-
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MILES are airline is revenues per mile from connecting Ai-Ej passengers; HU1Bim
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if airline i has one hub airport on market m; HU2Bim
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if airline i has two hub airports on market m; and
MAJHUBm is a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one of the airports on market
m is one of Atlanta, Dallas Forth-Worth, Houston IAH, Los Angeles LAX, Miami, New
York JFK, and Chicago OHare.
Estimation results are provided in table 27.
7A comment is warranted with regards to the low estimated value for the slope coe¢cient –
c: Airlines
draw connecting passengers from a wide range of markets. For example, in the third quarter of 1993,
an airline on market B-D draws, on average, connecting Ai-Ej passengers from 57 indirect routes with
one intermediate stop and 54 indirect routes with two stops. As mentioned in the text, they also draw
similar numbers from each market. Hence, we do not expect the revenues per seat from connecting
passengers to vary much with total seat capacity levels.
16Table 2.
Estimated mean parameter values (standard deviations) for the revenue schedule function for connecting passengers
Dependent variable is REV c
im=MILESm




0.303 -0.0446 0.0234 0.0259 0.0278 -0.0106 0.4350 -4.3£10¡5
(0.017) (0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0021) (0.0038) (0.0013) (0.0420) (0.9£10¡5)
5.6. The Revenue Schedule for Seat Capacity
The revenue schedule for airline is seat capacity on a market m is dened as the sum




















6. Inference in Game Theoretic Models
The estimation of the private signals distribution necessitates non standard economet-
ric techniques. Indeed, a key component of any game theoretic model with incomplete
information is that unobserved private signals are transformed into observed actions
(qi = '(ci;µ)). Besides, the strategic nature of games of incomplete information trans-
lates into the fundamental property that these strategies depend upon the underlying
probability distribution of types. Consequently, one cannot estimate jointly the func-
tional form of players strategies and the distribution of types from the sole observation
of actions, and one cannot directly estimates the distribution of unobserved types. The
specication problem is traditionally solved by imposing that strategies are Nash Equilib-
rium solutions of the game. To estimate the distribution of unobserved types, we adopt
the generic estimation principle recently proposed by Florens et al. (1997). Within this
estimation framework, one initially selects an unfeasible estimator e µ(c),w h e r e b yo n e
could estimate µ if the cost of all rms on every markets (c =( c1;:::;cN)) were known.
The corresponding feasible estimator
‡
b µ(q); b c(q)
·
(q =( q1;:::;qN)) of (µ;c) is dened
17as the xed point solution8











is the inverse strategy function calculated with the algorithm intro-
duced in section 3. In practice, the computation of such a xed point solution necessitates
iterating between equations (6) and (7) until convergence obtains. See Armantier and
Richard (1998) for additional numerical considerations.
Private signals are assumed to have a truncated normal distribution on ]0;1[
f (cim j ¹;¾)=
1













where F (0 j ¹;¾) is the cumulative distribution function of a normal distribution N (¹;¾):
We estimate µ
0 =( ¹;¾) 2<£]0;1[ with the inference method developed by Florens







F (b cim (q) j ¹;¾)
1 ¡ F (0 j ¹;¾)
!Ifqim=0g
[f (b cim (q) j ¹;¾)]
Ifqim>0g : (6.4)
Computing is of the order of 285 minutes of CPU time on a 7 years old DEC work-
station, for a Monte Carlo simulation size of MC = 1000.
8Conditions for the local identi￿cation of ￿ from the sole observation of q and for the existence and
(local) unicity of a ￿xed joint solution are found in Florens et al. (1997), together with characterizations
of the asymptotic distributions of b ￿ and b c.
187. Structural Estimation of the Airline Model
7.1. The Sample Data
We are now in a position to dene the sample data for our analyses. There are, in the
third quarter of 1993, 124 Chicago markets with ights. For six of these markets, no
data are reported in Databank DS T-100. For 33 of these markets, there are either
a s y m m e t r i e si nt h en u m b e ro fh u ba i r p o r t s( i . e . ,i nt h ev a l u e sf o rTWOHUBim in the
revenue schedule specication) between American Airlines and United Airlines, or there
is another airline (i.e., Delta, etc.) with ights. On the remaining 85 Chicago markets,
American Airlines and/or United Airlines are the only airlines with ights. In fact,
w ed on o to b s e r v ea n yo t h e ra i r l i n ew i t h i g h t so nt h e s em a r k e t so v e rat i m ep e r i o d
stretching from the third quarter of 1992 to the fourth quarter of 1993. We include
these 85 markets in our sample.
To this sample of 85 markets, we add 15 markets with no ights from any airline (e.g.,




imMILESm): Hence, our sample includes markets with zero, one, or
two airlines and contains, overall, 100 di¤erent Chicago markets.
The six markets with missing data link Chicago to a small city and have, at best,
minimal passenger volumes. These markets are ignored. For the 33 markets with asym-
metries and/or additional competition, we take the seat capacities for American Airlines
and United Airlines on these routes as a given. Given the stable environment at Chicago
OHare in terms of entry/exit decisions, these seat capacities vary little over a time pe-
riod stretching from the third quarter of 1992 to the fourth quarter of 1993 (see table).
In the third quarter of 1993, American Airlines seat capacity across these 33 markets
amounts to 2,396,654, while United Airlines is 2,705,356. To maintain the symmetry of
the model, we average these capacities across both airlines and use this average value,
2,551,005, as the starting value for
PM
j6=m qij in the revenue schedule specication.
197.2. Estimation Results
Note to the reader: We are in the nal stages of estimating our model over our full
sample of 100 Chicago markets. This means that our nal results are not yet available.
Nevertheless, before proceeding with a full sample estimation, we isolated a sample of
15 markets: two randomly selected monopoly markets and 13 randomly selected duopoly
ones.
Here are the data (table 1) and primary results (table 2) for these 15 markets:
Market 3-letter airport code miles Observed q1m Observed q2m
1 ABQ 1118 0 46122
2 BMI 116 0 35210
3 CMI 135 39734 45300
4 DBQ 147 47984 21066
5 ELP 1236 18618 28064
6 EVV 273 64500 82716
7 FAR 557 65850 56704
8 FNT 223 21248 50537
9 ISP 776 50356 68884
10 LAF 119 15924 12624
11 LSE 215 44370 54612
12 MKG 118 117896 208482
13 RFD 63 35989 67297
14 RST 268 17848 19838
15 TOL 214 21850 24386
Average 305.2 37477.8 54789.46
Standard Deviation 319.63 30302.87 47133.63
Table 7.1: Data
Tables 1 indicates that these routes o¤er a large variation of miles per routes, and a
large variation of quantities across routes and across companies.
The estimated parameters are (b ¹; b ¾)=( 0 :126;7:167E ¡ 04) with a standard devia-
tion calculated with a Monte Carlo simulation of (0:011;1:125E ¡ 05): This corresponds
to an estimated mean and standard deviation for the marginal cost of (0:127;2:661E ¡ 02):
In other words, the marginal cost of a seat per miles is in average 0.127$. This com-
20pares with CASM gures ranging, across trade publications, from 10 cents to 13 cents
depending upon which particular categories of costs these are accounted for. The main
estimation results are summarized in Table 2.
Market b Ei (qim) b Ei (cim) Expected Cost Percentage
(in $) per passenger(in $) of Entry
1 37337.24 (11765.37) 43.58 (17.5) 36.20 (12.6) 64.0
2 32452.48 (25545.56) 59.18 (35.2) 60.13 (31.8) 43.2
3 42427.88 (21879.61) 84.81 (29.0) 91.53 (30.7) 65.4
4 34040.28 (23600.15) 101.79 (59.6) 123.05 (58.4) 49.7
5 24326.44 (12338.51) 24.49 (10.2) 15.44 (8.7) 92.8
6 78751.27 (31673.43) 97.73 (29.7) 99.12 (26.1) 85.6
7 62512.71 (36195.88) 64.93 (33.7) 59.87 (28.6) 63.2
8 34333.99 (11341.31) 31.36 (17.4) 24.81 (12.9) 89.0
9 66938.26 (19676.40) 48.41 (21.3) 37.47 (19.4) 91.4
10 15222.85 (9711.07) 30.68 (17.5) 26.96 (14.4) 70.2
11 44641.60 (17491.55) 40.44 (22.4) 30.38 (17.0) 93.2
12 21266.98 (16777.48) 95.20 (31.8) 77.47 (26.5) 86.0
13 43446.38 (26510.79) 43.57 (26.6) 37.85 (22.1) 75.8
14 18042.52 (17743.24 53.33 (40.1) 58.48 (39.5) 35.9
15 24522.82 (13289.84) 27.23 (9.6) 19.87 (8.3) 95.6
Estimated parameter values with standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 7.2: Estimated Model
Overall the observed quantities (Table 1) are close to the expected quantities esti-
mated by the econometric model (Table 2) and well within one standard deviation. We
are also able to estimate the average treshold cost b Ei (cim) above which a company do
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